UN voting alignment with the United States and export dependence on China

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September 2013

Abstract: Western countries fear that rising economic importance of Chinese to developing countries worldwide will weaken their economic and political clout as well as undermine their aid efforts in pushing for good governance and other institutions critical for economic development. This paper presents evidence that having China as a major export market is associated with that country's UN General Assembly voting alignment with the United States, and the relationship is mediated by whether the country exports oil and minerals. Using a panel of 100 developing and emerging market economies spanning 1995–2008, I find regional differences in the relationship between export dependence on China and UN voting alignment after controlling for US grant aid disbursements. In Latin America, higher export dependence is associated with lower voting alignment. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this is true for countries that do not rely on oil and mineral exports. Resource-exporting countries in Africa have a lower level of voting alignment with the US relative to other countries, but their voting alignment does not vary with higher export dependence on China.

1 Introduction

Political scientists since Ball (1951) and Russett (1966) have attempted to identify international political alignments by studying voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). More recent studies look at the realignment of political alliances in the UN immediately following the break-up of the Soviet Union (Kim and Russett 1996; Holloway and Tomlinson 1995), and at the UN voting response to United States dominance in the post-Cold War era (Voeten 2004). A related strand of literature examines how trade dependence on powerful states such as the US or the former USSR impacts partner countries' political alignments with them in the UN (Armstrong 1981; Moon 1985; Richardson 1976; Richardson and Kegley 1980). In this paper, I use the UN voting paradigm to examine how the current global shift in economic power towards China impacts countries' political alignment with the US.

The re-emergence of China as a global economic and political force has spurred academic and policy debates on shifting international power structures. Gu, Humphrey and Messner (2008) and Hempson-Jones (2005) note that together with increased economic ties with many developing countries, China's sphere of political influence is also widening through its international engagements in multilateral arenas such as the WTO and UN peacekeeping efforts. The former argue that China's role as an economic and political driver of change alters the international playing field, and challenges both US hegemony and the Western norm of an OECD-centric world. News headlines such as "Rising China threatens US clout in Latin America" (*Reuters*)[1], "As U.S. turns to Asia, it sees China everywhere" (*The New York Times*)[2], and "China expands influence in Central Asia " (*The Telegraph*)[3] highlight this perceived threat.

The US Congress is clearly concerned. In October 2000, it created The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) "*with the legislative mandate to monitor, investigate, and submit to Congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action."*[4] Congressional hearings and reports by the USCC on *"China's Global Quest for Resources and Implications for the United States"*[5] and *"China in Latin America"*[6], and by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on *"China's Role in Africa –*

[1] Grudgings, Stuart and Simon Gardner (2011). "Analysis: Rising China Threatens U.S. Clout in Latin America." *Reuters* March 16.
[2] Calmes, Jackie (2011). "As U.S. Looks to Asia, It Sees China Everywhere." *The New York Times* November 15.
[3] Orange, Richard (2010). "China Expands Influence in Central Asia." *The Telegraph* June 10.
[4] US Government. "U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission." *Accessed* June 10, 2012. http://www.uscc.gov/
[5] US Congress. Senate (2012). *China's Global Quest for Resources and Implications for the United States*. January 26.
[6] http://www.uscc.gov/

Implications for U.S. Policy"[7] underscore the Congress' concern about China's influence and its impact on the US.

Driven by energy demands for an unprecedented rate of (mainly industrial) growth, China shed its isolationist policies and looked outward to establish economic interdependence and forge political ties with countries in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America, and particularly with resource abundant economies. China's economic strategy abroad has been to provide resource-backed loans tied to infrastructure development projects that are in turn mostly contracted out to Chinese firms. Investment in pipelines, oil and gas extraction, mining, and roads give China a stake in foreign oil and mineral resources, safeguarding against supply disruption in potentially uncertain world markets (Lee and Shalmon 2008). For developing countries, China's often indistinguishable aid and investment packages of low interest loans, infrastructure investments, technical training, grants and debt relief (Walz and Ramachandran 2010) offer a welcome alternative from Western political and economic dominance.

The focus of this paper is to analyze the impact of China's rising economic importance on US political influence in the UN General Assembly. Following the literature exploring trade dependence (Armstrong 1981; Moon 1985; Richardson 1976; Richardson and Kegley 1980; Pevehouse 2004), I use a country's export dependence on China as a measure of the latter's economic importance to that country. With this in mind, I ask three research questions surrounding the debate of an ascendant China: (1) Does a country's export dependence on China affect its UN voting coincidence with the US? (2) Given that countries exporting oil and mineral resources are strategically important to both China and the United States, is there a differential impact on voting coincidence for countries that export these resources? (3) Finally, are there regional differences in the impact on UN voting coincidence?[8] For instance, does Chinese influence in Africa differ from its influence in Central Asia? The findings can have important implications for US foreign policy, both towards China and towards their common trading partner. By revealing the political alignment tendencies of different regions, this study can also inform both the key players' negotiations in multilateral arenas, as well as academics who try to understand these processes.

With regards to the first question, I find no relationship between export dependence on China and a country's voting alignment with the United States. This is not surprising given a country's various foreign policy options under external dependence[9]. In international relations,

[7] US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs (2011). *China's Role in Africa - Implications for US Policy.* Nov 1.

[8] Holloway (1990) notes that regionalism has been suggested as a basis for UN bloc voting, citing the Eastern Bloc's proximity to the former USSR, and the (more dispersed) Western Bloc's proximity to the US. Further, the Afro-Arab Bloc of the 1960's influenced the formation of the Third World Bloc with the entry of new members.

[9] See (Hey 1993) for a detailed analysis of how countries facing external dependence can respond in the political arena with compliance, consensus, counterdependence, compensation or independence. The first two options result

dependence theory holds that weak states respond positively to rewards such as trade, foreign aid or investment from powerful states by conforming to the latters' political preferences (Moon 1985). So all else equal, increasing export dependence on China indicates a decreasing reliance on other trading partners including the US, and this should induce a lower degree of voting alignment with the US. On the other hand, a developing country government may worry about excessive dependence, and decide to balance economic dependence on China with political alignment with the US[10]. In this case, a country more economically dependent on China will vote more in line with the US. Since a response in either direction can occur, the negative and positive effects may average to a zero net effect in the estimate.

Next, in the pooled estimate I find that countries exporting oil and minerals exhibit different political alignment behaviour than the rest. For the latter, increasing export dependence on China is associated with decreasing voting coincidence with the US. Countries that export oil and minerals have a lower baseline level of voting coincidence with the US, but otherwise their voting alignment does not vary with export dependence on China.

Finally, I find that there are regional differences in political alignment with the US. The finding in the pooled estimate above reflects the political alignment behaviour of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Latin American economies also exhibit lower political alignment with the US as they become more reliant on China as an export destination, and this is true across all countries of the region, whether they export resources or not.

These findings can inform foreign policy considerations of the United States, China, and their trading partners. For instance, while increased trade with Latin American countries can be a mechanism for increasing its own influence there, China would want to rely more on non-trade channels to garner support from oil and mineral rich African countries. The US can in turn use tailor its strategies to raise its profile by identifying those countries where increased export dependence on China is associated with a decreased US influence as opposed to countries where the level of voting coincidence depends on the nature of exports rather than export shares to China[11].

Foreign aid is another impacted area. The Council on Foreign Relations[12,13] and Woods (2008) mention that donors from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's

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in increased political alignment, whereas the next two result in decreased alignment. As the name suggests, in the last case foreign policy is independent of external ties.

[10] The *Wall Street Journal* quotes Rubens Rucipero, a former Brazilian finance minister and former head of UNCTAD, as saying: "China is an important market, but Brazil shouldn't be putting all its eggs in one basket." Wessel, David and Paulo Prada. (2011). "China Forces Global Shift in Commerce." *The Wall Street Journal* March 11.

[11] See the following article where Hillary Clinton attempts to distinguish US efforts on the African continent from Chinese engagement, which she says is not always in Africa's long-term interests. Wonacott, Peter. (2011) "U.S. Aims to Gain New Edge in Africa." *The Wall Street Journal* June 11.

[12] Hanson, Stephanie. (2006). "China in Africa: Strictly Business." *Council on Foreign Relations, Analysis Brief* Nov 6.

Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) and human rights organizations fear that no-strings attached Chinese aid and investment channelled through corrupt African governments in exchange of oil and mineral exports undermine OECD aid efforts that aim to promote good governance and political freedom. On the other hand, African governments value investments in infrastructure that Western donors have been neglecting, and appreciate being able to use aid for the purposes they themselves prioritize. According to Solange Guo's article in the *BBC News*, a senior manager from the United Nations Economics Commission for Africa states: *"If you want concrete things you go to China. If you want to engage in endless discussion and discourse you go to the normal traditional donors."*[14] A case in point is Angola's breaking off negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2004 over demands for transparency regarding oil revenues, and accepting a $2 billion line of credit from China's Export Import Bank to be repaid with oil (Lee and Shalmon 2008). Thus the US and OECD donors in general should engage China more to push for demanding fiscal transparency of oil revenue and good governance from African and other governments. At the same time, it is perhaps time that the Western donors, both bilateral and multilateral, re-examine their stringent conditions for foreign aid and start thinking about viable ways of investing in much needed infrastructure for developing countries.

This research study also contributes to the political science literature strands on UN voting patterns and foreign policy under external dependence discussed above. However, instead of looking at how dependence on the US or the former USSR impacts their respective influence, I look at how the dependence on a rival trade partner affects US influence. In the field of economics, the findings add to the growing body of literature attempting to explain UN voting alignment (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Carter and Stone 2010, 2011). Despite the preoccupation with the issue of an ascendant China, there is no quantitative analysis regarding the effects on US influence to the best of my knowledge, and this paper aims to fill that gap.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 puts the global rise of China in perspective by elaborating on the scale and extent of China's economic and political engagements. In Section 3 I discuss my data sources and variables of interest, and Section 4 explains the empirical methodology. In Section 5 I present the results and robustness checks, and finally Section 6 concludes. All tables are included in the appendix at the end.

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[13] Alessi, Christopher and Stephanie Hanson. (2012) "Expanding China-Africa Oil Ties." *Council on Foreign Relations* February 8.

[14] Guo, Solange (2012). "Viewpoint: Africa Must Do More to Profit from China." *BBC News* May 21.

2 The Rise of China

With a population of over 1.3 billion inhabitants in 2010, China has been growing at a record annual average of 10 per cent since 1980[15]. Having outstripped its domestic energy resources, China turned into a net oil importer in 1993, and it became the both the second largest oil consumer in the world and the second largest oil importer behind the United States in 2009[16]. The US Energy Information Administration reports that China accounted for over a third of the world's oil consumption growth in 2010[17], and the International Energy Agency projects that China will account for 36 per cent of the increase in global energy between 2008 and 2035[18]. Between 2000 and 2006, 47 per cent of China's oil consumption increase – from 4.7 million bbl/day to 7.4 million bbl/day – was imported (Lee and Shalmon 2008). According to Holslag, Geeraerts, Gorus and Smis (2007), China's boom in manufacturing industries such as shipbuilding, railway construction and automobile manufacturing have caused its mineral imports to increase by more than 500 per cent for several metals between 1995 and 2005, and that China's imports of all metal ores except aluminium has exceeded that of the European Union (EU). In his testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, David Shinn asserts that China will not be able to sustain its manufacturing capacity and maintain a high GDP growth rate without its raw material imports from Africa and other regions of the world. China's private oil consumption is also increasing at a fast pace: 18.5 million cars were sold in China in 2010 compared to 13.1 million in the U.S[19], and up from 5.8 million in 2006[20].

Recognizing its external dependence for raw materials, the government of China implemented a "Go Out" strategy in 2000 encouraging Chinese companies to invest abroad, particularly in the energy, minerals and infrastructure sectors of resource-rich countries in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America. Beijing reinforces these economic linkages using its long-standing policy of fostering close political ties with as many countries as possible, and by emphasizing its policy of non-interference in domestic affairs of sovereign states. With access to ample funding from state banks, Chinese national oil companies have been able to outbid its competitors on various mineral exploration and extraction deals[21]. To ensure a steady and secure flow of minerals and other commodities and to guard against their price fluctuations, China's

[15] This is the growth rate based on GDP in constant 2000 US dollars from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (accessed June 21, 2012).
[16] U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010)"Country Analysis Brief: China."
[17] U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010) "Country Analysis Brief: China."
[18] International Energy Agency (2010) "World Energy Outlook 2010 Factsheet."
[19] Estimates of the eventual Chinese car market range from 25 to 75 million cars a year. "Chinese Carmakers: Still in Second Gear," *The Economist* May 5, 2012.
[20] "Carmaking in China: The Fast and the Furious," *The Economist* November 23, 2006.
[21] Ideally, China would be able to acquire equity stakes in foreign oil holdings, but countries have generally claimed ownership of their resources and foreign companies are left to manage and operate production and processing (Lee and Shalmon 2008).

strategy has been to provide large long-term loans to important resource abundant countries, with repayment to be made in a guaranteed flow of future oil or mineral exports. These are essentially long-term forward purchases of oil that are locked in more directly than term contract oil supplies[22]. State banks such as the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and, more recently, the China Development Bank (CDB), channel loans that are often concessional in nature to finance infrastructure projects such as roads, dams, refineries, buildings, pipelines and railways mostly contracted out to Chinese construction companies. Recent loans signed by China include those signed with South Sudan ($8 billion)[23], Angola ($14.5 billion), Ghana ($13 billion), the Democratic Republic of Congo ($6.5 billion)[24], Brazil ($10 billion for off-shore oil exploration), Ecuador ($1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant)[25] and Kazakhstan ($1.1 billion for a refinery upgrade)[26].

China's trade deals with a country often come with a complete package of financial assistance, investment, technical expertise and political backing in international forums (Lyman 2005), making it difficult to distinguish between aid and investment flows[27]. Chinese aid constitutes the concessional project loans mentioned above, along with grants, technical cooperation, scholarships for academic and professional training, tariff exemptions and debt relief (McCormick 2008). The Chinese differentiate their aid from that by the OECD's DAC donors by emphasizing that countries are partners not recipients, and that the transaction is not a gift but a mutually beneficial exchange. Estimates put China's aid figures between $1.5 billion in 2005 (Lancaster 2007) and $25 billion (Lum 2009) in 2007, though the upper estimate may include flows that should likely be classified as FDI[28]. The upper estimate would place China behind the US as the second largest foreign aid donor, and would means that China meets the UN target for the DAC donor countries of providing 0.7 per cent of GNI as aid[29] (Walz and Ramachandran 2010). Broadman (2008) reports that at the end of 2005, concessional loans to all of Africa stood at $800 million and spanned 55 projects in 22 countries. In 2006, during "China's Africa Policy" summit attended by 48 African leaders, President Hu Jintao announced

[22] Statement of Mikkal E. Herberg before the USCC in US Congress. Senate (2012). *China's Global Quest for Resources and Implications for the United States*. January 26.
[23] "China to Lend South Sudan $8 Billion." *Voice of America* April 27 2012.
[24] Statement of David Shinn before US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. (2011). *China's Role in Africa - Implications for Us Policy*. Nov 1.
[25] Romero, Simon and Alexei Barrionuevo. (2009). "Deals Help China Expand Sway in Latin America." *The New York Times* April 15.
[26] "China Lends $1.1 Bn for Kazakh Refinery Upgrade " *Reuters* June 6 2012.
[27] China and other BRIC donors do not report their foreign aid figures to the OECD DAC, and do not necessarily follow the DAC's criteria for what counts as Official Development Assistance (ODA) when measuring their aid flows (Walz and Ramachandran 2010).
[28] Discrepancies between loans signed and the foreign aid estimates can arise because the former are pledges, and not all the money may have materialized (Lum 2009).
[29] Since 2007, only five (Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) of the twenty-two (twenty-three since 2010) DAC members met this target. USA gave the least aid in 2007 and 2008 using this measure.

that China would double its assistance to Africa by 2009, provide them with $5 billion in concessional loans and credits, establish a $5 billion fund to encourage Chinese investment in Africa, and cancel the interest-free debt that 33 African countries owed. In contrast to conditionality attached to most foreign aid flows from OECD donors, Chinese loans come with no strings attached other than adherence to the "One-China" principle[30], and that the loans be used for mainly infrastructure projects carried out by Chinese companies. According to a literature survey on emerging economy donors by Walz and Ramachandran (2010), China's foreign assistance flows mainly to Africa (46 per cent), Asia (33 per cent) and Latin America (13 per cent). The same study gives the sector allocation of Chinese aid as follows: economic infrastructure (61 per cent), industry (16 per cent), energy and resources (9 per cent) and agriculture (4 per cent)[31].

Despite the enormous investments made by China in the resource rich countries, experts generally agree that Chinese energy related acquisitions do not threaten US (and Western) energy security[32]. For instance, while China imports a third of its oil from Africa, and while in 2009 oil and gas comprised 64 per cent of all African exports to China, this accounted for only 13 per cent of Africa's oil exports, with the US and the EEC each accounting for a third of the share[33]. However, China's rising influence with its trade and investment partners with the prospect of harnessing that influence in international and regional forums such as the UN Security Council (UNSC), World Trade Organisation (WTO), UN Human Rights Council and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is raising flags[34]. Gaining international support has been identified as the second goal (after securing resource imports) of Chinese presence in Africa, where China has diplomatic relations with fifty of the fifty-four countries, and all of which are well represented in multilateral organisations where China participates[35]. The US also worries about its failing influence in pressuring "rogue states" such as Sudan, Zimbabwe and Iran owing to China's willingness to trade with and invest in them[36, 37]. Recently, both China

[30] This principle states that China includes both the mainland and the island of Taiwan.
[31] (Lum 2009) investigates Chinese investment and foreign aid activities in only Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia and has a different breakdown. In the 2002–2007 period, 44 percent of the loans and economic assistance was allocated to Africa, 36 percent to Latin America and 20 percent to Southeast Asia. These flows were divided mainly between the natural resource and agriculture sectors (44.5 percent) and infrastructure projects (43 percent).
[32] Statement of Mikkal E. Herberg before the USCC in US Congress. Senate. (2012).
[33] Statement of David Shinn before US Congress. Senate. (2011).
[34] (Hempson-Jones 2005) notes that China's membership in intergovernmental organisations (IGO's) jumped from 1 to 21 in the 1971–1976 period, reached 37 by 1989, and stood at over 50 by 2005. These IGO's span economic, social, political, scientific and security realms.
[35] The remaining four – Burkina Faso, Swaziland, Gambia, and São Tomé and Principe – recognize Taiwan.
[36] Statement of Mikkal E. Herberg before the USCC in US Congress. Senate. (2012).
[37] In his statement to the Council on Foreign Relations' US-China Commission in (2005), Peter Lyman notes that China (and Malaysia) moved into the oil sector vacuum in Sudan "because western companies, in particular American and Canadian firms, were pressured to withdraw because of Sudan's civil war and charges of both persecution and the use of slavery against the people of the south, including in the region of oil production."

and Japan decided to circumvent EU sanctions on crude petroleum exports from Iran over its nuclear program controversy[38]. India too is trying to find ways to retain its Iranian supply [39, 40].

OECD donors and human rights organisations also worry about the no-strings attached loans on another front: they remonstrate that these loans overlook corrupt practices of recipient governments and hinder the efforts of Western donors in promoting good governance, political transparency, environmental sustainability, labour standards, and investment in social infrastructure. Nonetheless, developing countries like that Chinese loans are "materialized" in infrastructure projects rather than financial transfers for program support (Lancaster 2007) and are delivered faster, whereas the DAC donors stipulate many political and economic conditions be first met (Lum 2009). China's willingness to engage with repressive regimes like those in Sudan and Zimbabwe is also a cause for dismay. But as China's investments in conflict prone regions grow, so do its interests in protecting them. To this end, China has softened its stance on non-interference and sovereignty as evidenced by its convincing Sudan to allow UN peacekeeping forces into the country, supporting UN led sanctions against North Korea, and leading for the first time a peacekeeping mission to Somalia[41].

Some of China's trade partners are also wary of the effects of doing business with China. Lax labour standards in Chinese owned mines are a contentious issue, as illustrated by the furore caused by accidents in copper mines in Zambia[42]. Another concern is the deleterious impact of cheap imported Chinese textiles and manufacturing goods on domestic industries. Textile workers in South Africa and Indonesia, and manufacturing labour in Brazil are under pressure and their governments are worried[43]. However, Broadman (2008) notes that recently Chinese (and Indian) exports to African countries include more capital goods for use in the manufacturing sector[44], and the burgeoning middle class from both countries are increasingly buying African light manufactured products, household consumer goods, processed foods and using its back-office services, tourism facilities and telecommunications.

In its own backyard, China is embroiled in territorial disputes over resource-rich island groups or fishing grounds and in river water-sharing issues with its neighbours. China has had increasingly muscular skirmishes with the Philippines over claims to Spratlay Islands (also

[38] "China and Japan Secure Iran Oil Supply, Bypassing Eu Sanctions." *RT* June 20, 2012.
[39] Rapoza, Kenneth. (2012). "How Europe Globally Enforces Iran Oil Embargo." *Forbes* March 2.
[40] Sharma, Rakesh and Shantanu Choudhury (2012). "India Working on Insurance for Iran Oil Imports." *The Wall Street Journal* June 22.
[41] Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie and Andrew Small. (2007). "China Jumps In." *International Herald Tribune* February 1.
[42] Hanson, Stephanie. (2006) "Zambia's Vote: The China Issue." *Council on Foreign Relations, Analysis Brief* October 2.
[43] Wessel and Prada (2011). "China Forces Global Shift in Commerce." *The Wall Street Journal* March 11.
[44] In 2000, China's exports to Africa consisted mainly of textiles and clothing (28 percent), machinery and transportation equipment (27 percent), and other manufactured goods (26 percent). By 2009, the export composition changed to more value added goods including communications equipment (20 percent), road transport vehicles (19 percent), and electronic machinery (18 percent). Statement of David Shinn before US Congress. Senate. (2011)

claimed by Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam) and Scarborough Reef (also claimed by Taiwan) in the South China Sea[45]. It also has maritime disputes with Japan over the Senaku/Diaoyu Islands and with Taiwan over the Paracel Islands (Stares et al. 2011). Although similar incursions in 1995 drew no reaction from the US government despite being approached by the Philippines on the issue (Mauzy and Job 2007), recently the US has been vocal in its support for the East and Southeast Asian nations and is actively engaged with them in conducting joint military exercises[46]. Smaller states in the region have even asked the US to provide a counterweight against China's rising might. Although China has forged close ties with its Southeast Asian neighbours using trade, aid and diplomatic agreements and joint ventures, these countries are still wary of dominance by China in the long-term and would prefer to maintain a balance of major powers in the area (Mauzy and Job 2007).

Despite the frictions discussed above, China's increasingly outward looking policies and engagements in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America have turned it into an economic giant and it is economically important to its trade partners. In 2009 China edged out the US to become Africa's largest trading partner[47]. In 2010, it became the top trading partner of six G-20 economies, namely Australia, Japan, Korea, India, Russia and South Africa, and overtook the US to become the top export market for a seventh, Brazil[48]. In 2010, China also became the largest source of FDI in Brazil[49]. *The Sunday Telegraph* notes that China has strengthened ties with the "red" South American states of Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, and that it is expected to supersede the European Union as the region's largest global partner in 2015[50]. China's influence in Latin America strengthened further when in 2009 it joined the Inter-American Development Bank, where the US has de facto veto power[51]. In Central Asia, China seeks to ensure its energy and security interests through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, whose other members are Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan[52], and as of June 2012, Afghanistan as an observer[53]. China completed a pipeline linking it to oil-rich Kazakhstan in 2005 (Kutlantzick

[45] Jacobs, Andrew (2011). "Dispute over Bare Islands Underscores Philippine's Rocky Relations with China." *The New York Times* November 15.
[46] Calmes, Jackie (2011). "As U.S. Looks to Asia, It Sees China Everywhere." *The New York Times* November 15.
[47] Wonacott, Peter. (2011) "U.S. Aims to Gain New Edge in Africa." *The Wall Street Journal* June 11.
[48] Wessel and Prada (2011) "China Forces Global Shift in Commerce." *The Wall Street Journal* March 11.
[49] Grudgings and Gardner (2011).
[50] "China's Global Interests." *The Sunday Telegraph*, June 26, 2011.
[51] The capital constrained IADB was trying to triple its capital and increase its lending to $18 billion in 2009, up from $11.2billion in 2008. To put the amounts in perspective, just one Chinese loan to Brazil for it's national oil company was $10 billion. (2009) "Deals Help China Expand Sway in Latin America." *The New York Times* April 15.
[52] "China, Russia Expand Influence Via Central Asia Group." *Business Ghana* June 7 2012.
[53] Cooley, Alexander (2012). "In Central Asia, Public Cooperation and Private Rivalry." *International Herald Tribune* June 8.

2007), and the Central Asia gas pipeline in 2009[54]. In 2010 it signed a natural gas deal with Uzbekistan, which would tie up all the latter's spare gas capacity[55].

Analysts point out that there is no overt conflict of interest between the United States and China. As *The Economist*[56] puts it, "China and America are bound to be rivals, but they do not have to be antagonists."[57] There are areas of agreement and of divergence in policy issues as noted in the Council on Foreign Relations' Summary Report (Africa-China-US Trilateral Dialogue 2006) on the Africa-China-US Trilateral Dialogue, but they and the majority of political commentators advocate a US policy that engages China to act together on common interest issues and to resolve divergent ones by resorting to multilateral processes (Economy and Oksenberg 1997)[58]. Nonetheless, countries including the US are eminently aware that, as Kutlantzick (2007) put it, "China has begun to go global in influence as well as economics."

3 Data

My dataset is a panel of about one hundred developing countries from 1975 to 2008. These countries, listed in Table 3A.1 in Appendix 3A, are members of the United Nations, and trade with both China and the United States. China's ascendance as an international economic power began in the mid-1990's, and thus the dataset allows me to compare the impact of Chinese trade ties in two different periods: 1975 to 1994 and 1995 to 2008. However, data availability and the emergence of new countries (such as the Newly Independent States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia) mean that the panels are unbalanced.

Table 3A.2 in the Appendix lists the variables used in this study, along with brief descriptions and their sources. The dependent variable in my analysis is UN General Assembly voting coincidence between the US and its trading partner, and aims to capture the degree of political alignment between the two. One can argue that the UNGA is not a perfect reflection of international politics owing to the non-binding nature of its resolutions and the fact that it is only one of several multilateral forums through which international politics plays out (Russett 1966). However, there are several characteristics of the UNGA voting system that make these votes a good candidate for depicting political alignment for the purposes of this paper. The UNGA is the only international arena where we can observe its 150-plus members vote on a regular basis on a wide range of issues concerning the global community (Russett 1966; Voeten 2000). Patterns of UN votes are also highly correlated with alternative measures of political alignment

[54] Orange, Richard. (2010). "China Expands Influence in Central Asia." *The Telegraph* June 10.
[55] Orange, Richard. (2010).
[56] "The Dangers of a Rising China," *The Economist*, December 2, 2010.
[57] The same article explains: "The best way to turn China into an opponent is to treat it as one."
[58] In a hearing before the United States Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations on May 15, 2008 on U.S.-China relations in the Era of Globalization, Richard N. Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, advocated the US to pursue a "selective partnership" with China, that is to show "willingness and ability to work together when interests coincide."

such as alliances and similarity of interests (Alesina and Weder 2002; Russett 1966). Voting patterns across a range of issues can be a useful gauge of the general political orientations of the UN member states, and observing voting alignments over time can help pinpoint changes in the political orientations.

In contrast to the UN Security Council (UNSC) which consists of five permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States) wielding veto power and a two-year rotating body of ten additional elected members and where resolutions have passed recently by near-consensus, there is no veto in the UNGA and resolutions are passed by a two-thirds majority of all members present and voting. While the UNGA and UNSC cannot mediate on the same issue, once a resolution fails in the UNSC it can be taken up in the UNGA. This provides additional information on where member states stand on international issues that had been previously debated in a forum with more "teeth". In addition, Kim and Russett (1996) note that while China depends more on its veto power in the UNSC due to its political distance from the other permanent members, it has many allies in the UNGA.

Finally, US Public Law 98-151 passed in 1983 mandates an annual report to the Congress assessing voting coincidence of members in the UNGA and UNSC with the US[59,60]. The reports note that UN votes together with other aspects of a country's relationship are important in determining US bilateral relationships and informing their foreign policies. Along with voting coincidence of the US with each member country, the report also presents voting coincidences by region, voting bloc and issue. The first report filed for 1983 argues that while a single vote on a single issue is not representative of a country's position, a cumulative record of votes indicates a country's general policy orientation. Furthermore, while UN votes are one element of several that determine US foreign policy, voting in the United Nations also provides valuable information for developing these relationships. The UNGA voting data therefore lends itself for use in this study.

I use the United Nations General Assembly Voting Data from Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009). The database records the votes on all UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions from 1946 through 2008. I calculate UN voting alignment between the United States and its trading partner using only Yes, No and Abstain votes[61]. Two countries are aligned on an issue if they cast the same vote and this is coded as 1; otherwise they are not aligned and this is coded as 0[62].

[59] Princeton University Library. (2010). "Voting Patterns in the United States: A Highly Selective Listing." United Nations Collection. United Nations Depository Library No. 007.
[60] US Department of State. (2012). "Reports to Congress, U.S. Votes, Fact Sheets, Testimony." Bureau of International Organization Affairs.
[61] The dataset encodes two other possibilities: Absent and Not a Member. Many studies treat Absences as Abstentions, but as Voeten (2004) points out, states can be absent for reasons such as civil conflict or government turnover rather than to avoid voting. Following this argument, these instances are dropped.
[62] See Dreher *et al.* (2008) for a quick recount of the different ways UN voting coincidence has been calculated in the literature. The difference in the weight (1, 0.5 or 0) attached to abstentions and absences in the UN plenary

In constructing a variable depicting a country's general level of political alignment with the US, I take into account the fact that US looks at the cumulative voting position of a country, which can vary from regime to regime. Using these scores and information on government regimes from Beck et al.'s (2001) World Bank Database of Political Institutions (DPI)[63], I calculate the cumulative UN voting alignment for that year as the number of alignments as a share of total votes during that regime's tenure. Table 3A.3 reports the summary statistics on voting alignment with the US and trade variables by region.

The source of the trade variables is the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) (2010). Deviating from previous literature, the variable of interest is a country's export dependence on China, rather than on the US (Armstrong 1981; Moon 1985; Pevehouse 2004; Richardson 1976; Richardson and Kegley 1980). Importance of China as an export market for a country is its total exports to China as a share of its total exports. Richardson and Kegley (1980) make a distinction between "trade sensitivity" and "trade vulnerability", arguing that "annual upward and downward shifts in export dependence may denote a shift in sensitivity (such as from price fluctuations) but they do not mirror any basic change in an economy's long run vulnerability." However, if a country is trade sensitive over time, it is likely to be trade vulnerable. To capture the element of export dependence vulnerability, I calculate export dependence on China by summing the real exports to China over a regime's lifetime and dividing by the total real exports over the same period. Similar measures are calculated for export dependence on the US other important trade partners, namely France, Germany and Japan.

In order to determine whether a country significantly depends on oil and mineral exports, I use data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2009) on a country's share of fuel and mineral ores exports. Demographic and economic controls such as GDP, population, money supply, consumer price index (CPI) and percentage of labour force in the armed forces are also from the World Bank WDI (2009). In addition, I use the Freedom House Index (2009) for political freedom and civil liberties to control for democracy as previous literature indicates that democracy is associated with UN voting coincidence (Dreher and Strum 2006). A lower score indicates greater political and civil freedom.

Exports are not the only channel of external dependence that can induce political alignment. Richardson and Kegley (1980) note that foreign aid can also create dependence. Carter and Stone (2010, 2011), Dreher *et al.* (2008) and Wang (1999) all find that foreign aid increases UN voting coincidence during the time period relevant for this study[64]. Arguing that foreign aid disbursements are most likely linked to voting behaviour on key issues, all but one of

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sessions. The political science literature tends to use the Lijphart (1963) Index of Agreement which is identical to the one I use, but where the Yes-Abstain and No-Abstain votes carry a weight of 0.5 each instead of 0.

[63] Updated December 2010.

[64] Earlier work that find similar results include Wittkopf (1973), Armstrong (1981) and Moon (1985).

these studies use only those UN votes that are identified as being important to the US in the annual *Report to Congress of Voting Practises in the United States*[65]. Dreher et al (2008) use all available UN roll call votes and show that the United States tends to buy votes in the UNGA using Official Development Assistance (ODA) grant disbursements and budget support for the recipient government. I therefore include ODA grant disbursements from the OECD Development Assistant Committee's International Development Statistics (2009) database as an explanatory variable. However, causality may run from greater UN voting alignment leading to higher amounts of aid. To address endogeneity issues, I use a two stage least squares (2sls) approach, which is discussed in detail in the next section.

4 Empirical Strategy

I first test a simple baseline equation to see if a country's export dependence on China affects its voting alignment with the United States:

$$UN_{rt} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 Grant_{rt} + \delta_2 Export\ Dep\text{-}US_{rt-1} + \delta_3 Export\ Dep\text{-}China_{rt-1} + \boldsymbol{\beta X}_{rt-1} + \mu_r + \varepsilon_{rt} \quad (1)$$

where UN_{rt} is the voting alignment between the US and an aid recipient country, r. $Grant_{rt}$ is the US ODA grant disbursements to the aid recipient country, and $Export\ Dep\text{-}US_{rt-1}$ is the one year-lag of a recipient country's exports to the US as a share of total recipient exports. This measures the extent of a country's export dependence on the US. While the key idea of this paper is to test how export dependence affects the voting decision, it is reasonable to argue that countries will also think about other means of leverage available to them. In this case, if the recipient is an important source of imports for the US, all else equal it may not feel as pressured to vote in line with the US at the UNGA, and the coefficient, δ_2, will be negative.

$Export\ Dep\text{-}China_{rt-1}$ measures the one year lagged export dependence on China, and this is our variable of interest. If China's importance as an export destination for the aid recipient increases, this could potentially signal a decreasing export dependence on the US, and the country will feel less compelled to vote in line with the US when there is no innate consensus on the resolution being debated. In that case the country may vote according to its own preferences, or it may want to politically align itself with China.

$\boldsymbol{X}_{rt-1}$ is a vector of controls including the recipients' export dependence on France, Germany and Japan, and a set of lagged economic indicators such as GDP, population, money supply (M2) and consumer price index (CPI). Following the end of the Cold War era, studies have shown that (continental) Western Europe and Japan have been slowly drifting from the US in their voting patterns (Holloway and Tomlinson 1995; Voeten 2000). The *1998 Report to Congress of Voting Practices in the United Nations* also note the divergence in voting

[65] http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/

coincidence between the US and the European Union. As such, developing countries may worry about balancing external relations between the US and the trio of France, Germany and Japan, which are generally big trade partners. The set of controls also include lagged political variables. To capture the fact that more democratic countries tend to vote more closely with the US (Carter and Stone 2011; Voeten 2000), I use the Freedom House index for political freedom and civil liberties. Following Dreher *et al.* (2008) I also include armed forces as a percentage of a country's total labour force.

The United States is likely to have some basic bilateral relationship defined outside oh the UN General Assembly. For instance, due to their geographical proximity to the US Latin American countries have historically had stronger trade ties with the US. Other time invariant characteristics may include common language and geopolitical considerations to mention a few. To allow for such recipient specific effects, the error term is composed of a time invariant error component (μ_r), and a time variant idiosyncratic component (ε_{rt}).

The panel nature of the dataset lends itself to fixed effects estimation. However, there is a potential causality issue between *UN* voting alignment and *Grants Disbursements*, as these two variables are contemporaneous. Disbursements take place over the course of the year, whereas the UN voting sessions take place between September and December, thus mitigating the endogeneity concern. It therefore appears reasonable to assume that voting that takes place in the latter third of the year is based on grants disbursements already made earlier in the year and those that have been negotiated for the remainder of the year rather than using the previous year's amounts. I expect higher disbursements to increase voting alignment in the UNGA, so that δ_1 is positive. However, if UN voting records also influence grant disbursements, then the coefficient will be biased up. Following Dreher et al (2008), I implement a two staged least squares (2sls) fixed effects estimation using grant disbursements from Nordic countries as an instrument for US grant disbursements. Aid from Nordic countries has generally been shown to be quite free of political and other strategic interests (Berthélemy 2006), and better targeted to development goals in the recipient countries. By instrumenting US grant disbursements with Nordic country grant disbursements I am able to capture the part of US grants that are targeted towards development needs and independent of US strategic interests.

5 Results

5.1 Is export dependence on China related to changes in UN voting alignment with the US?

According to the dependence theory in international relations, weak states respond to rewards such as trade, foreign aid or investment from powerful states by conforming to the latters' political preferences (Moon 1985). So all else equal, increasing export dependence on

China indicates a decreasing reliance on other trading partners including the US, and this should induce a lower degree of voting alignment with the US. Indeed, policy experts worry that having China as an economic alternative to the US dilutes the latter's influence in issues of bilateral and global importance. David Shinn states *"Even countries that have good relations with the United States, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Angola, Ghana and South Africa, find themselves in a position where they can be much more selective in taking advice from the United States."*[66] On the other hand, a weak state may worry about excessive dependence, and decide instead to balance economic dependence on China with political alignment with the US. Thus a country more economically dependent on China may conform to US voting policies. Since a response in either direction can occur, it is difficult to predict whether increasing export dependence on China is positively or negatively related to UN voting coincidence with the US, and the outcome is likely to be an empirical balance of the two voting strategies. In this section, I test the baseline model to see if and how export dependence on China affects UN voting alignment with the US.

Table 4 shows the results of the fixed effects estimation of equation (1) for the period 1995-2008. Column (1) contains *US Grant Disbursements* and all export dependence variables only, and in Column (2) I add time fixed effects. Column (3) reports the estimates with political and demographic controls while Column (4) adds time fixed effects. Finally in Column (5) I add economic controls (M2 and CPI) with time fixed effects. The coefficient on *Export Dep-China* is not significant, and nor are the dependence measures for the US *Grant disbursements* and *Export Dep-US*.

Next, I estimate equation (1) using 2SLS with country fixed effects. The first stage results are given in Table 5, where I regress US *Grant Disbursements* (the endogenous regressor in the structural equation) on the exogenous instrument, *Scandinavian Grant Disbursements*, and the remaining exogenous regressors in the structural equation given in (1). The coefficient on *Scandinavian Grant Disbursements* is significant at the 1 per cent level, and partial R-square indicates that the instrument explains roughly 17 per cent of the variation in *US Grant disbursements*. The F-test of excluded instruments exceeds the rule of thumb value of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997), indicating the regression does not suffer from a weak instruments problem. In a regression of UN voting alignment (not shown), the coefficient on the instrument is not significant at the 1, 5 or 10 per cent levels. Therefore the instrument has no direct impact on UN voting alignment with the US and can be omitted from the structural equation.

Table 6 presents the 2sls results. The coefficient on US *Grant Disbursements* is now significant, although the standard errors have as expected increased from the fixed effects estimation. As in previous literature, grant disbursements positively affect UN voting alignment

[66] Statement of David Shinn before US Congress. Senate (2011).

with the US[67]. The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test of under identification is rejected at the 5 per cent level, indicating that the endogenous regressor is identified, and the size of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic being larger than the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values further corroborates that weak instrumentation is not a concern.

An increase in the recipient's *Export Dependence* on the US is associated with a decrease in voting alignment as before, but now the relationship is significant. A potential explanation is countries that are important to the US as trading partners have more leeway in voting differently than the US. The coefficient for bilateral *Export Dependence on China*, however, is not significant. Having China as an export market does not appear to affect a country's voting incidence with the US in the UN General Assembly. As discussed before, this is not surprising. Depending on their internal politics and on whether they are trying to counter dependence on the US or on China, different countries can have different voting responses leading to a zero net effect in a pooled estimation.

It is interesting to note that a higher *Export Dependence* on Germany is associated with increased voting alignment with the US. This may be because countries are offsetting their economic dependence on Germany by politically aligning with the US.

5.2 Do oil and mineral exporting countries vote differently?

Experts assert that friction between China and US is more likely to arise from their differing approaches in Africa rather than the competition for oil, with China prioritizing economic development over political rights and transparency.[68,69] However with the US projected to import a quarter of its oil from Africa by 2015,[70] energy security remains a high priority in the US foreign policy agenda. It is no surprise then that following Angola's admission to OPEC in 2007, an independent commission of the Council on Foreign Relations issued a report[71] advising the US to strengthen its energy and security interests in the Gulf of Guinea[72] by forging closer ties with Angola, which at that time was China's largest and US' sixth largest oil supplier. Recognizing China's strong involvement in Angola in terms of oil-backed loans and infrastructure investments, the report suggests that despite mutually beneficial

[67] For the period 1975-1994, the coefficient on Grant disbursements in not significant. During the Cold War era, the US may have used other instruments such as military aid, which by definition does not fall under the OECD DAC's ODA figures.
[68] McLeary, Paul. 2007. "A Different Kind of Great Game." *Foreign Policy*, March 6.
[69] In fact, Hanson (2007)reports that China blocked US attempts at the UN to impose heavy sanctions on the Sudanese government for supporting militia led attacks against civilians in Darfur.
[70] Mouawad, Jad. (2007). "Nowadays, Angola Is Oil's Topic A." *The New York Times* March 20.
[71] Council on Foreign Relations. (Toward an Angola strategy: Prioritizing U.S.-Angola relations 2007). "Toward an Angola Strategy: Prioritizing U.S.-Angola Relations." *Report of an Independent Commission sponsored by The Center for Preventive Action*.
[72] The coast along the Gulf of Guinea is shared by several oil producers in West Africa, namely Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo and Cameroon. Given that Angola has only recently emerged from a long and arduous civil war, stability in the Gulf of Guinea is highly desirable.

close economic ties with China, Angola might at some point "decide to balance its external relations, wary of becoming too dependent on its Asian partner."

In the following test, I ask whether oil and mineral exporting countries vote differently in the UN General assembly. Specifically, do oil-exporting countries try to balance their economic dependence on China by voting more in line with the US? To distinguish the UN voting behaviour of oil and mineral exporters, I implement a difference-in-difference approach to estimate:

$$UN_{rt} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 Grant\ Disbursements_{rt} + \delta_2 Export\ Dep\text{-}US_{rt-1} + \delta_3 Export\ Dep\text{-}China_{rt-1} + \delta_4 OILMIN_{rt-1} + \delta_5 OILMIN{*}Export\ Dep\text{-}China_{rt-1} + \boldsymbol{\beta X}_{rt-1} + \mu_r + \varepsilon_{rt}. \quad (2)$$

$OILMIN_{rt-1}$ is a binary indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if a recipient country derives at least 20 per cent of its export receipts from fuels and minerals. The coefficient on the interaction term captures the additional effect of exporting to China for countries that export more oil and minerals.

I estimate equation (2) using both fixed effects and 2sls with fixed effects. Table 7 presents both the fixed effects and 2sls fixed effects estimates.[73] The coefficient for *Grant Disbursements* is positive, but significant only in Column (5) of the 2sls estimates, and the coefficient for the *Export Dependence on US* is negative and significant.

The coefficient on *Export Dep-China*, δ_3, is now negative and significant throughout, indicating that having China as an export destination causes non-resource exporting countries to vote less in line with the US. The coefficient for the *OILMIN* dummy (δ_4) is negative and significant, indicating that resource-exporting countries have a lower level of voting coincidence with the US. However, the coefficient on the interaction term, δ_5, is positive and significant, and the linear combination of $\delta_3 + \delta_5$ is not significantly different from zero[74]. So countries that export oil and minerals maintain their political alignment with the US regardless of their exports to China, given the effect of exporting resources itself.

5.3 Are there regional differences in UN voting alignment with the US?

What other factors could be associated with an asymmetric UN voting alignment response to export dependence on China? Holloway (1990) mentions that regionalism is one of the drivers of voting patterns in the UN, as evidenced by the geographical proximity of the Eastern bloc to the former USSR and the (more dispersed) Western bloc to the US. Voeten (2000) also finds the remnants of an East–West divide in voting patterns in the post-Cold War era.

[73] First stage results from this point forward are not reported but are available upon request.

[74] P-values for the linear combination $\delta_3 + \delta_5$ range from 0.411 to 0.992 for the fixed effects estimation and from 0.368 to 0.962 for the two-stage least squares estimation instrumenting for US ODA *Grant Disbursements*.

In this section, I investigate whether countries exhibit systematic regional differences in political alignment behaviour given their export dependence on China. The discussion by Hey (1993) on a country's foreign policy options under economic dependence provides a useful framework for examining regional responses in voting alignment. She notes that contrary to the compliance called for under dependence theory, Latin American countries have been showing a decreasing degree of foreign policy compliance despite a deep economic dependence on the US. The decreasing alignment can be explained by the dependent government's frustration with the US either because US dictated policies prove damaging to the former and the politically demeaning nature of the dependent status itself (a counterdependence response), or because the governments of the dependent countries bow to popular domestic pressures to defy the hegemon (a compensation response). Given this tendency to decrease compliance with the US in the UN, having China as an alternate trading partner should further reduce the degree of political alignment with the US. On the other hand, China is the regional hegemon for countries in Central and Southeast Asia, and I would expect them to balance their increasing dependence on China by increasing their political alignment with the United States.

I introduce regional dummies for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), South Asia (SA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). By interacting the dummies with the three variables of interest indicated below, I test for regional differences in voting alignment using the following equation:

$$UN_{rt} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 Grant\ Disbursements_{rt} + \delta_2\, US\ Trade\ Share \quad +$$

$$\sum_i \delta_{3i} REG_i * Export\ Dep\text{-}China_{rt-1} + \sum_i \delta_{4i} REG_i * OILMIN_{rt-1} +$$

$$\sum_i \delta_{5i} REG_i * OILMIN_{rt-1} * Export\ Dep\text{-}China_{rt-1} + \boldsymbol{\beta X}_{rt-1} + \mu_r + \varepsilon_{rt}. \qquad (3)$$

where REG_i is a dummy variable for region i. For instance, REG_{LAC} takes on a value of 1 if $i=LAC$, and 0 otherwise.

Table 8 present the results of the fixed effects and 2sls estimations, but without the dummy variable *OILMIN* and its interaction with *Export Dependence on China*. The coefficients for the *Export Dependence* variable for Latin America and Caribbean, East Asia and Pacific and the Middle East and North Africa are all significant. As expected, increasing export dependence on China is associated with decreasing political alignment with the US by Latin American and Caribbean countries. For countries in East Asia and the Pacific, the association is negative, whereas for the MENA region the association is positive. The US has many strategic alliances in the Middle East and North Africa, most notably with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.

I present the results of the fixed effects estimation of equation (3) incorporating the differential behaviour of oil and mineral exporting countries according to region in two separate tables: Tables 9A (for the EAP, ECA, LAC and SSA regions) and 9B (for the MENA and SA

regions). Each of the columns (1) to (4) represent a different cut-off for the *OILMIN* dummy variable set at oil and mineral exports comprising 10 per cent, 20 per cent, 30 per cent and 40 per cent of the country's total exports.[75] The results for the 2sls estimation of equation (3) are broken into Tables 10A and 10B, with the former reporting the coefficients for EAP, ECA, LAC and SSA. The relationships for Latin American countries from the last estimation shown in Table 8 hold across the four cut-offs for the *OILMIN* dummy as resource exporting countries don't behave differently. A 1 percentage point increase in export dependence on China is associated with a decrease in UN political alignment of 0.75 to 1.04 percentage points (depending on the *OILMIN* cut-off) in Latin America. The results obtained in Section 5.2 (Table 7) are true only in the case of the Sub-Saharan region: oil and mineral exporting countries in this region maintain their political alignment with the US irrespective of their economic dependence on China. Sub-Saharan countries that do not export oil and mineral resources decrease their political alignment with the US by 0.57 to 0.73 percentage points when their export dependence on China increases by 1 percentage point. The level of alignment for resource-exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is 1.40 to 2.61 percentage points lower than the rest, but there is no additional change in alignment associated with a change in export dependence on China.

The results from the last estimation shown in Table 8 no longer hold, or are no longer consistent, for the EAP (Table 10A) and the MENA (Table 10B) regions. Table 11 summarizes the results of the estimation by giving the signs on the coefficients of interest, and indicating whether these signs were significant across any or all four cut-off conditions for the *OILMIN* indicator variable. Only the results for LAC and SSA are consistent across all four specifications. Although the results are not significant for the most part, both the EAP and ECA countries consistently have a negative coefficient for *Export Dep-China* (δ_3) and a positive coefficient for the interaction term *OILMIN*Export Dep-China* (δ_5). The coefficient for *OILMIN* (δ_4) is positive and sometimes significant for EAP, but negative (and never significant) for ECA. The results for the MENA and South Asia regions vary in their signs, making it difficult to draw any conclusions. One reason that the signs or the significance of the tests change across the different specifications is that the countries included in the resource-exporting countries group is sensitive to the *OILMIN* variable cutoff. Since the War on Terror, US interest increased in Central Asia for its proximity to Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the Asia Pacific as the second front of the war, especially in the countries with sizeable Muslim populations such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. However, the degree of alliances in these regions and the Middle East has varied widely, and this is potentially making it difficult to pin down any systematic results.

[75] The regions with consistent and/or significant results across all four export thresholds are presented together in Table 9A.

Finally Table 12 presents the results on tests of linear combinations for *Export Dep-China + OILMIN*Export Dep-China* $(\delta_3 + \delta_5)$. It is clear from the table that in Latin America and the Caribbean, both resource exporters and non-exporters behave the same way in that increased export dependence on China is associated with lower voting alignment with the US. There is no observable relationship on countering export dependence with UN alignment for Europe and Central Asia. However, the responses of mineral resource exporters differ from countries that don't export mineral resources in the remaining regions.

5.4 Robustness

In this section I subject the above empirical model to various robustness tests, but the central results remain unaltered. All the results for the robustness checks can be found in Appendix C unless otherwise noted.

First, I use alternative ways to measure the US aid variable on the right hand side of the equations to be tested. Aid has been shown to be important in explaining UN voting alignment, and I want to make sure any variation in voting alignments that is due to aid is being properly accounted for. I change the instrumental variable by adding Canada to the list of Scandinavian countries. Thus US aid disbursements are instrumented with aid from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The results (not shown[76]) for estimations above do not change. Next I use grant commitments instead of grant disbursements in the 2sls estimations without altering the main results, but grant commitments appear to be a better predictor of UN voting alignment (results not shown). This may be because the endogeneity issue is much less of a problem with aid commitments as they are declared before UN voting sessions begin. Finally, I use US grant disbursement share of total grants received by a recipient instead of total US grant disbursements. In this specification it isn't possible to instrument for US aid commitment shares using Scandinavian aid shares as there is a necessarily negative relationship between the two. Again, the central results (not reported) remain unchanged.

The results are for the most part invariant to different methods of calculating the UN voting alignment. In one measure I add Absences (with both countries being Absent counting as an agreement) to Yes, No and Abstain votes, while in the other I consider only Yes and No votes. Table 13 presents the results with the more conservative measure of UN voting with Absences. Now countries in the East Asia and Pacific behave like Latin American countries, and while countries in Europe and Central Asia show a similar tendency the results aren't as strong for them. In addition, oil and mineral exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa now tend to increase their UN voting alignment with the US with increased export dependence on China. When I use only Yes and No votes to calculate UN voting coincidence, oil and mineral exporter

[76] All unreported results are available upon request, and have been omitted for the sake of tractability.

from Latin America behave differently than non-exporters in that their UN voting is independent of export dependence on China (see Table 14).

I also look at a year-to-year measure of UN voting alignment instead of the regime-specific measure, and although the signs on the coefficients are the same, the significance disappears for countries in the Sub-Saharan region. On the other hand, the variable denoting Export Dependence on the US exhibits a stronger negative relationship, indicating that countries' UN voting in a given year is more responsive than a regime's cumulative voting coincidence to cumulative export dependence on the US over the regime's tenure. Grant disbursements also show a stronger positive relationship. Thus UN voting also responds more immediately to ODA flows. The year-to-year voting response of resource exporters compared to non-exporters is different than before (Table 15). The negative association for Latin America and Sub-Saharan countries disappear, and that of countries in Europe and Central Asia become significant. For the East Asia and Pacific region, UN voting alignment with USA for non-resource exporters increases with higher export dependence on China. This is consistent with the newspaper account of countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam being wary of Chinese influence in the region and looking to the US to maintain political equilibrium in the region.

Finally, I look at the relationship between Export dependence on China and voting alignment with the US in a different time period. Since the economic rise of China started in the mid-90's, I focused on the 1995–2008 period in my estimations so far. To see if the same effect prevailed in an earlier period, I test equation (2) for the 1975 – 1994 time period. There are no robust significant relationships evident in this estimation (results not shown). However, the number of observations drop drastically, making it difficult to rely on the power of the test. There are fewer observations in part because this is before the break up of the USSR and other Eastern European countries.

6 Summary and Discussion

This paper looks at how China's rising economic importance to its trading partners affects the latter's UN voting alignment with the United States. The results indicate that there are regional differences in voting responses. In Latin America, countries with increasing export dependence on China show lower voting alignment with the United States. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa behave differently depending on whether they export oil and mineral resources. Like their Latin American counterparts, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that don't export resources show a negative relationship between UN voting alignment and export dependence on China. Whereas there is no such relationship for the resource exporting countries, they have a lower overall level of voting alignment with the US.

The purpose of presenting these results is to analyze how the emergence of China as a major economic power is reshaping political influence in the international arena, and specifically

in the United Nations General Assembly. Following the demise of the USSR, the bipolar influence in the world gave way to a unipolar one as the US emerged as the sole superpower after the Cold War. Academics have demonstrated the United States' waning influence in the United Nations since the 1970's. Further loss of popularity following the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, which were largely perceived to be unilaterally instigated, has made the US realize the importance of building international alliances. Added to that, the presence of China as an alternate trading partner, source of investment and aid donor weakens US influence over developing countries even more. However, as the results above indicate, the changes in voting alignment are not uniform and these differences are important for foreign policy formulations for China and the US. In so far as UN voting behaviour is indicative of political alliances and commonality of interests, the results are also useful in manoeuvring bilateral or regional relationships outside the UNGA.

The US is Latin America's largest trade partner, and the negative relationship between voting alignment and Chinese export dependence should signal to the US that maintaining alliances in that region requires some form of soft power such as increased foreign aid, higher level diplomatic visits, mutually beneficial investments and so on. For China, it means that forming alliances will prove easier in Latin America through trade and investment deals than in its own backyard where her East Asian neighbours' increased export dependence on China does not have a clear association with UN voting alignment. Not surprisingly then, while China's foray into Africa, Central Asia and Latin America has been characterized by large credit lines, infrastructure projects and aid packages, its involvement in Southeast Asia has been less overt and in the form of aid and joint ventures. According to Kutlantzick (2006), Chinese aid in 2005 was twice that of the US in Indonesia, thrice as much in Laos and four times as much in the Philippines (quoted in Gu *et al.* (2008)). Recently however, China has been flexing its military muscles in staking claims to several disputed islands near the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea, which is host to some of the world's busiest shipping lanes, potentially large oil and gas reserves, and fishing grounds which by some estimates supply one tenth of the world's seafood[77]. Despite the large amounts of aid, we therefore see some weak evidence of countries in the East Asia and Pacific balancing their economic dependence on China by voting more with the US. The implication for the US is that it should reassert its relations with the countries in this region to maintain influence. Indeed the US has been engaging its allies in Southeast Asia and Australia and providing a "counterweight" to China's rising influence in the area by showing support in the regional multilateral forums and conducting joint military exercises[78]. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where UN voting coincidence is lower among resource

[77] Jacobs, Andrew. (2011). "Dispute over Bare Islands Underscores Philippine's Rocky Relations with China." *The New York Times* November 15.
[78] Calmes, Jackie.(2011). "As U.S. Looks to Asia, It Sees China Everywhere." *The New York Times* November 15.

exporters and decreases with increased dependence on exports to China in the rest, China is seen as a welcome alternative to the US. Expert advice that the US engage with China and work together on common interests and to convince China to use its influence on issues such as good governance and political transparency is therefore especially critical here.

There are policy implications for developing countries too. Having China as a trade and investment partner challenges the trade and aid dominance by the West, and puts developing countries in a better position to negotiate the terms of aid, trade and investments, and in dictating the economic policies for their own country. Of course, in cases where the government is corrupt and does not use its new clout to make welfare enhancing decisions, Chinese influence may indeed be the unwelcome alternative that human rights and nongovernmental organisations fear.

In this paper I provide a snapshot of how a country's UN voting alignment with the US varies with its export dependence on China, and whether there are differences in voting behaviour by region and composition of exports. However, political alignments have many nuances and other factors that explain these nuances need to be studied to understand voting patterns and foreign policy options. First, this paper focuses on economic aid but past studies have shown the importance of military aid in inducing foreign policy compliance (Armstrong 1981). Next, while using all UNGA votes is useful in presenting the general level and direction of alignment, it will be useful to ascertain whether voting coincidence with the US differs according to issue dimension, such as disarmament or the Palestine-Israel issue or by issue importance. The US Department of State identifies which of the UNGA votes each year are key for US interests. If voting alignment is lower for key US votes compared to all votes, then US influence may be less than expected, and vice versa. Finally, decreasing alignment with the US doesn't necessarily indicate increasing alignment with China. While the US and China historically have a low voting coincidence, they have been voting together more in recent months as China's role in international forums grow. Thus it may be important to see if countries that are economically dependent on China and the US vote more with one or the other, or against both.

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Appendix

Table 1
List of Countries by Region

East Asia & Pacific (EAP)	El Salvador	**Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)**
Cambodia	Guatemala	Angola
Indonesia	Guyana	Benin
Laos	Haiti	Burkina Faso
Malaysia	Honduras	Burundi
Mongolia	Jamaica	Cameroon
Papua New Guinea	Mexico	Cape Verde
Philippines	Nicaragua	Central African Rep.
Thailand	Panama	Chad
	Paraguay	Congo, Dem. Rep.
Europe & Central Asia (ECA)	Peru	Congo, Rep.
Albania	Trinidad and Tobago	Cote d'Ivoire
Armenia	Uruguay	Ethiopia
Azerbaijan	Venezuela	Gabon
Belarus		Gambia
Bosnia-Herzegovina	**Middle East & North Africa (MENA)**	Guinea
Croatia	Algeria	Guinea-Bissau
Cyprus	Djibouti	Kenya
Georgia	Egypt	Malawi
Kazakhstan	Iran	Mali
Kyrgyz Republic	Jordan	Mauritania
Macedonia, FYR	Lebanon	Mauritius
Moldova	Libya	Mozambique
Tajikistan	Morocco	Niger
Turkey	Oman	Nigeria
Turkmenistan	Saudi Arabia	Rwanda
Ukraine	Syria	Senegal
Uzbekistan	Tunisia	Sierra Leone
	Yemen	South Africa
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)		Sudan
Argentina	**South Asia (SA)**	Tanzania
Barbados	Bangladesh	Togo
Belize	India	Uganda
Bolivia	Nepal	Zambia
Brazil	Pakistan	Zimbabwe
Chile	Sri Lanka	
Colombia		
Costa Rica		
Dominican Republic		
Ecuador		

Table 2
Variable Description and Sources

Variable	Description	Sources
UN voting alignment	Number of times a country votes together with the US as a share of total UNGA votes (%)	Voeten & Merdzanovic (2009)
Export Dep-China	Exports to China as share of total exports (%)	IMF (2010)
Export Dep-US	Exports to US as share of total exports (%)	IMF (2010)
Export Dep-France	Exports to France as share of total exports (%)	IMF (2010)
Export Dep-Germany	Exports to Germany as share of total exports (%)	IMF (2010)
Export Dep-Japan	Exports to Japan as share of total exports (%)	IMF (2010)
US grant disbursements	Annual US ODA grant disbursements (constant 2000 US$ millions)	OECD (2010)
Scandinavian grant disbursements	Annual ODA grant disbursements from Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (constant 2000 US$ millions)	
FH	Average of the two Freedom House rankings for political freedom and civil liberties.	Freedom House (2009)
%/ Armed forces	Armed forces personnel as share of total population (%)	World Bank (2010)
Real GDP	Gross Domestic Product of trading partner (constant 2000 $US millions)	World Bank (2010)
Pop	Trading partners population (millions)	World Bank (2010)
US Real GDP	US Gross Domestic Product of trading partner (constant 2000 $US millions)	World Bank (2010)
US Pop	US population (millions)	World Bank (2010)
M2	Money supply of trading partner	World Bank (2010)
CPI2005	Consumer price index of trading partner (Base year = 2005)	World Bank (2010)

Table 3
Summary Statistics by Region

Variables	N	Mean	St. dev	Min	Max
All Regions					
UN voting alignment	1231	19.02251	8.239302	0	77.02702
Export Dependence on China	1231	1.709031	4.092313	0	53.68132
Export Dependence on US	1231	12.24199	15.46018	0	82.20116
Export Dependence on France	1231	3.330802	5.105458	0	33.42015
Export Dependence on Germany	1231	3.351494	3.641074	0.0170635	25.28416
Export Dependence on Japan	1231	3.056523	5.654288	0	38.98546
East Asia and Pacific					
UN voting alignment	105	16.60401	6.99202	4	36.93694
Export Dependence on China	105	6.260372	10.17174	0.0670819	53.68132
Export Dependence on US	105	12.32667	8.77472	0.1388955	33.20308
Europe and Central Asia					
UN voting alignment	186	28.79191	8.632329	3.846154	63.88889
Export Dependence on China	186	0.5722917	1.029546	0	4.027117
Export Dependence on US	186	1.797353	2.248866	0.0026952	9.143526
Latin America and Caribbean					
UN voting alignment	303	20.2637	7.028543	5.194805	37.09678
Export Dependence on China	303	1.100757	1.969386	0	10.25237
Export Dependence on US	303	26.7837	19.67588	1.10671	82.20116
Middle East and North Africa					
UN voting alignment	135	15.72053	8.421201	7.142857	77.02702
Export Dependence on China	135	2.117754	3.480208	0.0103498	12.84217
Export Dependence on US	135	4.581213	5.37217	0	21.26929
South Asia					
UN voting alignment	70	15.47498	4.967475	7.792208	25
Export Dependence on China	70	0.9156098	1.063528	0	4.020683
Export Dependence on US	70	19.43935	6.770288	8.917297	31.01211
Sub-Saharan Africa					
UN voting alignment	432	16.14023	5.644276	0	36.36364
Export Dependence on China	432	1.519706	3.106957	0	29.65112
Export Dependence on US	432	7.746759	11.44531	0.0048866	50.16905

Table 4

FE Estimation of UN Voting Alignment with USA and Export Dependence 1995-2008

	Dependent variable is UN voting alignment				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
US Grant Disbursements	-0.004	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Export Dep-USA$_{t-1}$	-0.182**	-0.065	-0.052	-0.058	-0.062
	(0.069)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.437***	-0.042	-0.084	-0.037	-0.092
	(0.127)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Export Dep-France$_{t-1}$	0.553**	0.073	0.053	0.041	0.049
	(0.231)	(0.178)	(0.204)	(0.214)	(0.231)
Export Dep-Germany$_{t-1}$	0.812***	0.206*	0.257**	0.238**	0.212
	(0.197)	(0.121)	(0.127)	(0.115)	(0.129)
Export Dep-Japan$_{t-1}$	0.352*	-0.008	0.036	0.038	0.120
	(0.182)	(0.114)	(0.125)	(0.120)	(0.116)
FH$_{t-1}$			-0.358	-0.214	-0.209
			(0.323)	(0.311)	(0.314)
% Armed Forces$_{t-1}$			0.945***	0.201	0.372
			(0.332)	(0.359)	(0.413)
M2$_{t-1}$					0.013
					(0.037)
CPI2005$_{t-1}$					-0.004
					(0.020)
Real GDP$_{t-1}$			-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pop$_{t-1}$			0.054***	0.061***	0.063***
			(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
US Real GDP$_{t-1}$			0.000	-0.000***	0.000***
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
US Pop$_{t-1}$			-0.482***	0.946***	-0.647***
			(0.102)	(0.187)	(0.150)
Year		-0.810***		0.000	0.000
		(0.062)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1287	1287	1231	1231	1115
R-squared	0.209	0.636	0.606	0.650	0.667
Number of countries	105	105	102	102	96
Joint significance	0.000	0.305	0.164	0.239	0.338
Year FE	N	Y	N	Y	Y

NOTE. FE = fixed effects. All columns include country fixed effects. Year dummies are not shown. P-values are reported for the test of joint significance of *US Grant Disbursements* and all *Export Dependence* variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at countries, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 5
First Stage Estimation of UN Voting Alignment with USA and Export Dependence
1995-2008

	Dependent variable is US Grant Disbursements				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	First stage	First stage	First stage	First stage	First stage
Scandinavian Grant Disbursements	1.837***	1.842***	1.976***	1.998***	1.912***
	(0.461)	(0.437)	(0.445)	(0.439)	(0.450)
Export Dep-USA$_{t-1}$	0.767	0.329	0.589	0.570	0.390
	(0.542)	(0.497)	(0.459)	(0.442)	(0.401)
Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	1.273	0.118	0.081	0.229	-0.090
	(1.204)	(0.992)	(0.964)	(1.012)	(0.946)
Export Dep-France$_{t-1}$	-0.771	1.175	0.658	0.711	0.381
	(1.027)	(1.047)	(1.028)	(1.084)	(1.237)
Export Dep-Germany$_{t-1}$	-6.255**	-3.878*	-3.694	-3.661	-4.299
	(2.537)	(2.226)	(2.344)	(2.370)	(2.649)
Export Dep-Japan$_{t-1}$	-1.863	-0.238	-0.177	-0.148	0.227
	(2.577)	(2.387)	(2.266)	(2.280)	(2.721)
FH$_{t-1}$			15.622**	16.014**	18.543**
			(7.600)	(7.751)	(8.844)
% Armed Forces$_{t-1}$			-9.311	-11.442	-17.307
			(8.307)	(10.323)	(11.304)
M2$_{t-1}$					-1.513*
					(0.809)
CPI2005$_{t-1}$					0.134
					(0.205)
Real GDP$_{t-1}$			-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pop$_{t-1}$			1.505***	1.538***	1.585***
			(0.535)	(0.541)	(0.504)
US Real GDP$_{t-1}$			-0.000***	0.003**	0.003***
			(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
US Pop$_{t-1}$			7.311***	1,685.528**	1,705.597***
			(1.982)	(719.076)	(630.561)
Year		27.941***		-5,565.591**	-5,630.855***
		(7.657)		(2,383.879)	(2,089.832)
Observations	1287	1287	1230	1230	1114
R-squared	0.200	0.240	0.245	0.259	0.250
Number of countries	105	105	101	101	95
Partial R-squared	0.170	0.177	0.172	0.172	0.167
F test - excluded instruments	15.89	17.80	16.43	16.98	17.71
F test (p-value)	0.000125	5.25e-05	0.000100	7.81e-05	5.88e-05

NOTE. Table presents first stage results for 2SLS estimation in Table 6. The exogenous instrument is grant disbursements from Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. All columns include country fixed effects. Year dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at countries, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 6
2SLS Estimation of UN Voting Alignment with USA and Export Dependence
1995-2008

	Dependent variable is UN voting alignment				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
US Grant Disbursements	0.003	0.008*	0.007*	0.009**	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Export Dep-USA$_{t-1}$	-0.190***	-0.068*	-0.056	-0.063*	-0.064*
	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.448***	-0.043	-0.083	-0.036	-0.093
	(0.134)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Export Dep-France$_{t-1}$	0.565**	0.071	0.051	0.039	0.050
	(0.232)	(0.175)	(0.202)	(0.210)	(0.225)
Export Dep-Germany$_{t-1}$	0.864***	0.227*	0.276**	0.264**	0.238*
	(0.201)	(0.122)	(0.129)	(0.116)	(0.130)
Export Dep-Japan$_{t-1}$	0.383**	0.004	0.047	0.055	0.133
	(0.188)	(0.115)	(0.126)	(0.122)	(0.115)
FH$_{t-1}$			-0.386	-0.253	-0.258
			(0.328)	(0.323)	(0.325)
% Armed Forces$_{t-1}$			0.966***	0.235	0.442
			(0.339)	(0.374)	(0.421)
M2$_{t-1}$					0.023
					(0.038)
CPI2005$_{t-1}$					-0.006
					(0.020)
Real GDP$_{t-1}$			-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pop$_{t-1}$			0.052***	0.057***	0.060***
			(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
US Real GDP$_{t-1}$			0.000	0.000***	0.000***
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
US Pop$_{t-1}$			-0.512***	84.570***	80.714***
			(0.101)	(22.808)	(19.036)
Year		-0.370*		-279.967***	-267.123***
		(0.192)		(75.620)	(63.067)
Observations	1287	1287	1230	1230	1114
R-squared	0.195	0.630	0.601	0.641	0.661
Number of countries	105	105	101	101	95
Kleibergen-Paap LM test	3.972	4.205	4.288	4.368	4.751
LM test (p-value)	0.0463	0.0403	0.0384	0.0366	0.0293
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F	15.89	17.80	16.85	17.71	17.69
Joint significance	0	0.219	0.123	0.0383	0.191

NOTE. 2SLS = two stage least squares. The exogenous instrument is grant disbursements from Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. All columns include country fixed effects. Year dummies are not shown. The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic tests for underidentification. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic tests for weak instruments, and the corresponding F statistic can be compared against Stock and Yogo (2005) values for maximal IV size. P-values are reported for the test of joint significance of *US Grant Disbursements* and all *Export Dependence* variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at countries, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 7
UN Voting Alignment with USA and Export Dependence by Oil Exporter Status
1995-2008

	Dependent variable is UN voting alignment					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	FE	FE	FE	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
US Grant Disbursements	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.005	0.007*	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Export Dep-USA$_{t-1}$	-0.052	-0.057	-0.063*	-0.055	-0.061*	-0.064*
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.793***	-0.635***	-0.708***	-0.770***	-0.597***	-0.678***
	(0.145)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.146)	(0.155)	(0.156)
OILMIN$_{t-1}$	-1.584**	-1.096*	-1.085**	-1.556**	-1.040*	-1.041**
	(0.628)	(0.562)	(0.546)	(0.611)	(0.542)	(0.524)
OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	0.767***	0.643***	0.662***	0.744***	0.601***	0.630***
	(0.141)	(0.150)	(0.159)	(0.142)	(0.146)	(0.153)
Export Dep-France$_{t-1}$	0.068	0.053	0.065	0.067	0.051	0.065
	(0.192)	(0.204)	(0.223)	(0.190)	(0.201)	(0.217)
Export Dep-Germany$_{t-1}$	0.254**	0.239**	0.215*	0.266**	0.259**	0.233*
	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.112)	(0.126)
Export Dep-Japan$_{t-1}$	0.079	0.072	0.152	0.085	0.082	0.159
	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.116)	(0.112)
FH$_{t-1}$	-0.374	-0.236	-0.223	-0.390	-0.264	-0.255
	(0.311)	(0.302)	(0.309)	(0.314)	(0.310)	(0.315)
% Armed Forces$_{t-1}$	0.964***	0.245	0.412	0.976***	0.268	0.457
	(0.323)	(0.355)	(0.404)	(0.327)	(0.365)	(0.407)
M2$_{t-1}$			0.002			0.009
			(0.037)			(0.038)
CPI2005$_{t-1}$			-0.013			-0.014
			(0.019)			(0.020)
Year		0.000	0.000		-320.237***	-295.246***
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(65.852)	(64.169)
Year FE's	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Observations	1231	1231	1115	1230	1230	1114
R-squared	0.618	0.658	0.677	0.617	0.653	0.674
Number of countries	102	102	96	101	101	95
$\delta 3 + \delta 5$ (p-value)	0.992	0.915	0.411	0.962	0.943	0.368
Joint significance	0.000	0.003	0.006	5.05e-07	1.34e-05	0.000689
Kleibergen-Paap LM test				4.338	4.588	5.113
LM test (p-value)				0.0373	0.0322	0.0237
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F				16.99	18.33	18.52

NOTE. FE = fixed effects; 2SLS = two stage least squares. The exogenous instrument is grant disbursements from Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. All columns include country fixed effects and demographic controls. Year dummies are not shown. The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic tests for underidentification. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic tests for weak instruments, and the corresponding F statistic can be compared against Stock and Yogo (2005) values for maximal IV size. P-values are reported for the test of joint significance of *US Grant Disbursements* and all *Export Dependence* variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at countries, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 8
UN Voting Alignment with USA and Export Dependence on China by Region
1995-2008

	Dependent variable is UN voting alignment					
VARIABLES	(1) FE	(2) FE	(3) FE	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
US Grant Disbursements	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.009**	0.008**	0.006
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Export Dep-USA$_{t-1}$	-0.060	-0.052	-0.061	-0.064*	-0.056	-0.063*
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.036)
EAP Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.079***	-0.069**	-0.058**	-0.072***	-0.063**	-0.052*
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)
ECA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-3.336	-3.057	-3.215	-3.301	-3.017	-3.160
	(2.198)	(2.090)	(2.501)	(2.154)	(2.047)	(2.456)
LAC Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.745***	-0.727***	-0.752***	-0.706***	-0.695***	-0.722***
	(0.221)	(0.230)	(0.239)	(0.222)	(0.230)	(0.240)
MENA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	0.758***	0.825***	0.605***	0.777***	0.844***	0.617***
	(0.205)	(0.225)	(0.168)	(0.213)	(0.231)	(0.171)
SA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	1.610	-1.163	-0.789	1.374	-1.367	-1.046
	(0.975)	(1.337)	(1.296)	(1.321)	(1.515)	(1.459)
SSA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.005	-0.015	-0.215	-0.024	-0.031	-0.244
	(0.139)	(0.153)	(0.228)	(0.138)	(0.155)	(0.220)
Export Dep-France$_{t-1}$	0.086	0.067	0.095	0.085	0.066	0.095
	(0.176)	(0.211)	(0.219)	(0.172)	(0.206)	(0.210)
Export Dep-Germany$_{t-1}$	0.246**	0.277**	0.252**	0.271**	0.299***	0.274**
	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.125)	(0.118)	(0.114)	(0.125)
Export Dep-Japan$_{t-1}$	0.032	0.070	0.140	0.043	0.080	0.155
	(0.103)	(0.119)	(0.116)	(0.105)	(0.121)	(0.115)
FH$_{t-1}$		-0.272	-0.269		-0.295	-0.303
		(0.321)	(0.329)		(0.323)	(0.332)
% Armed Forces$_{t-1}$		0.178	0.353		0.203	0.416
		(0.328)	(0.381)		(0.343)	(0.389)
Observations	1287	1231	1115	1287	1230	1114
R-squared	0.650	0.663	0.677	0.641	0.657	0.671
Number of countries	105	102	96	105	101	95
Joint significance	0.000	0.001	0.003	2.62e-07	1.57e-05	0.000667
Kleibergen-Paap LM test				4.641	4.507	5.058
LM test (p-value)				0.0312	0.0338	0.0245
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F				24.35	18.17	20.16

NOTE. FE = fixed effects; 2SLS = two stage least squares. The exogenous instrument is grant disbursements from Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. All columns include country and year fixed effects. Columns (1) and (4) don't contain any demographic, economic or political controls. Columns (2) and (5) control for demographic and political characteristics, and Columns (3) and (6) additionally control for the economic variables: CPI2005 and M2. Year dummies are not shown. The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic tests for underidentification. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic tests for weak instruments, and the corresponding F statistic can be compared against Stock and Yogo (2005) values for maximal IV size. P-values are reported for the test of joint significance of *US Grant Disbursements* and all *Export Dependence* variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at countries, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 9A

FE Estimation of Regional UN Voting Alignment with USA and Export Dependence on China by Oil Exporter Status at Different Oil Export Thresholds

1995-2008

EAP-ECA-LAC-SSA

	Dependent variable is UN voting alignment			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	FE / OIL10	FE / OIL20	FE / OIL30	FE / OIL40
US Grant Disbursements	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Export Dep-USA$_{t-1}$	-0.048	-0.047	-0.050	-0.048
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
EAP Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.225	-0.206	-0.142	-0.408**
	(0.236)	(0.189)	(0.184)	(0.204)
ECA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-9.345	-3.616*	-3.433	-3.132
	(7.125)	(2.030)	(2.119)	(2.102)
LAC Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-1.082***	-0.774**	-0.789**	-0.846***
	(0.312)	(0.314)	(0.307)	(0.316)
SSA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.636**	-0.721***	-0.778***	-0.777***
	(0.244)	(0.231)	(0.241)	(0.239)
EAP OILMIN$_{t-1}$	1.557	3.019***	0.887	2.745***
	(1.369)	(0.578)	(1.584)	(0.596)
ECA OILMIN$_{t-1}$	-4.396	-2.592	-1.324	-0.115
	(3.061)	(2.900)	(2.077)	(2.375)
LAC OILMIN$_{t-1}$	-0.857*	-0.711	-0.325	-1.018
	(0.512)	(0.853)	(1.135)	(1.082)
SSA OILMIN$_{t-1}$	-1.528***	-1.690***	-2.676***	-1.622***
	(0.399)	(0.623)	(0.540)	(0.549)
EAP OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	0.163	0.147	0.081	0.362*
	(0.233)	(0.185)	(0.182)	(0.204)
ECA OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	6.782	1.445*	0.633	-0.157
	(7.233)	(0.835)	(0.673)	(0.816)
LAC OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	0.417	0.088	0.165	0.209
	(0.348)	(0.321)	(0.390)	(0.388)
SSA OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	0.672***	0.772***	0.843***	0.843***
	(0.198)	(0.186)	(0.201)	(0.195)
Observations	1231	1231	1231	1231
R-squared	0.674	0.674	0.675	0.675
Number of countries	102	102	102	102
Joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

NOTE. FE = fixed effects. OIL10, OIL20, OIL30 and OIL40 indicate thresholds of oil and mineral forming 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% of total exports for the *OILMIN* dummy. The coefficients for the corresponding variables for Middle East and North Africa and the South Asia regions are presented in Table 9B for the sake of clarity. All columns include country and year fixed effects and the set of demographic and political controls. Year dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at countries, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 9B

FE Estimation of Regional UN Voting Alignment with USA and Export Dependence on China by Oil Exporter Status at Different Oil Export Thresholds

1995-2008

MENA-SA

	Dependent variable is UN voting alignment			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	FE / OIL10	FE / OIL20	FE / OIL30	FE / OIL40
MENA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	4.825**	-3.233	-2.581	-1.847
	(2.416)	(3.251)	(3.856)	(3.443)
SA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.759	-1.084	-0.960	-1.118
	(1.584)	(1.343)	(1.190)	(1.209)
MENA OILMIN$_{t-1}$	3.090***	-2.196	-4.070**	-2.378
	(0.709)	(2.270)	(1.953)	(1.996)
SA OILMIN$_{t-1}$	0.618	0.559	-1.187*	-1.131*
	(1.017)	(0.932)	(0.616)	(0.589)
MENA OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-3.981	4.101	3.454	2.698
	(2.413)	(3.250)	(3.855)	(3.440)
SA OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.660	-0.175	7.842***	7.766***
	(0.679)	(0.384)	(0.946)	(0.904)
Observations	1231	1231	1231	1231
R-squared	0.674	0.674	0.675	0.675
Number of countries	102	102	102	102
Joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

NOTE. FE = fixed effects. OIL10, OIL20, OIL30 and OIL40 indicate thresholds of oil and mineral forming 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% of total exports for the *OILMIN* dummy. All columns include country and year fixed effects and the set of demographic and political controls. Year dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at countries, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 10A
Regional UN Voting Alignment with USA and Export Dependence on China
by Oil Exporter Status at Different Oil Exporting Thresholds
1995-2008
EAP-ECA-LAC-SSA

	Dependent variable is UN voting alignment			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	2SLS/OIL10	2SLS/OIL20	2SLS/OIL30	2SLS/OIL40
Grant Disbursements	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Export Dep-USA$_{t-1}$	-0.052	-0.050	-0.053	-0.051
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)
EAP Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.198	-0.184	-0.127	-0.421**
	(0.238)	(0.189)	(0.180)	(0.213)
ECA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-8.760	-3.580*	-3.388	-3.088
	(7.081)	(1.978)	(2.068)	(2.054)
LAC Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-1.041***	-0.745**	-0.764**	-0.831***
	(0.306)	(0.307)	(0.301)	(0.311)
SSA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.573**	-0.672***	-0.731***	-0.734***
	(0.242)	(0.229)	(0.239)	(0.237)
EAP OILMIN$_{t-1}$	1.530	2.951***	0.878	2.624***
	(1.317)	(0.570)	(1.501)	(0.602)
ECA OILMIN$_{t-1}$	-4.303	-2.592	-1.335	-0.098
	(3.016)	(2.807)	(2.021)	(2.332)
LAC OILMIN$_{t-1}$	-0.854*	-0.709	-0.504	-1.106
	(0.478)	(0.801)	(1.148)	(1.047)
SSA OILMIN$_{t-1}$	-1.407***	-1.604***	-2.605***	-1.526***
	(0.409)	(0.587)	(0.534)	(0.547)
EAP OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	0.140	0.129	0.071	0.380*
	(0.234)	(0.184)	(0.178)	(0.213)
ECA OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	6.214	1.451*	0.618	-0.188
	(7.183)	(0.810)	(0.654)	(0.797)
LAC OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	0.402	0.085	0.163	0.225
	(0.339)	(0.315)	(0.386)	(0.382)
SSA OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	0.589***	0.705***	0.778***	0.781***
	(0.193)	(0.181)	(0.195)	(0.193)
Observations	1230	1230	1230	1230
R-squared	0.669	0.669	0.671	0.671
Number of countries	101	101	101	101
Kleibergen-Paap LM test	4.561	4.741	4.748	4.766
LM test (p-value)	0.0327	0.0295	0.0293	0.0290
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic	18.12	18.92	18.87	18.87
Joint significance	0	0	0	0

NOTE. 2SLS = two stage least squares. Exogenous instrument is grant disbursements from Netherlands and Scandinavia. OIL10, OIL20, OIL30 and OIL40 indicate thresholds of oil and mineral forming 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% of total exports for the *OILMIN* dummy. The coefficients for the corresponding variables for Middle East and North Africa and the South Asia regions are presented in Table 10B for the sake of clarity. All columns include country and year fixed effects, and the set of demographic and political controls. Year dummies are not shown. The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic tests for underidentification. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic tests for weak instruments, and the corresponding F statistic can be compared against Stock and Yogo (2005) values for maximal IV size. P-values are reported for the test of joint significance of *US Grant Disbursements* and all *Export Dependence* variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at countries, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 10B
Regional UN Voting Alignment with USA and Export Dependence on China
by Oil Exporter Status at Different Oil Export Thresholds
1995-2008
MENA-SA

	Dependent variable is UN voting alignment			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	2SLS/OIL10	2SLS/OIL20	2SLS/OIL30	2SLS/OIL40
MENA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	4.192*	-3.405	-2.515	-1.684
	(2.547)	(3.040)	(3.626)	(3.131)
SA Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-1.269	-1.356	-1.130	-1.300
	(1.739)	(1.446)	(1.242)	(1.250)
MENA OILMIN$_{t-1}$	2.870***	-2.314	-4.621**	-2.737
	(0.704)	(2.136)	(2.248)	(2.135)
SA OILMIN$_{t-1}$	0.497	0.547	-1.222*	-1.161*
	(0.959)	(0.905)	(0.645)	(0.616)
MENA OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-3.335	4.287	3.400	2.546
	(2.550)	(3.041)	(3.626)	(3.128)
SA OILMIN$_{t-1}$* Export Dep-China$_{t-1}$	-0.149	0.082	8.312***	8.229***
	(0.907)	(0.506)	(1.086)	(1.028)

NOTE. 2SLS = two stage least squares. The exogenous instrument is grant disbursements from Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. OIL10, OIL20, OIL30 and OIL40 indicate thresholds of oil and mineral forming 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% of total exports for the *OILMIN* dummy. The coefficients for the corresponding variables for the East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African regions can be found in Table 10A, along with all relevant test statistics for the estimations. All columns include country and year fixed effects and the set of demographic and political controls. Year dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at countries, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 11
Summary of Regional UN Voting Alignment with US and Export Dependence on China by Oil Exporter Status at Different Oil Exporting Thresholds
1995-2008

Variable/Region	*Export Dep-China (δ_3)*	*OIL&MIN (δ_4)*	*OIL&MIN* Export Dep-China (δ_5)*
EAP	(–)*	(+)**	(+)*
ECA	(–)*	(–)	(+)*
LAC	(–)****	(–)*	(+)
MENA	(+)*/(–)	(+)*/(–)*	(+)/(–)*
SA	(–)	(+)/(–)*	(+)**/(–)
SSA	(–)****	(–)****	(+)****

NOTE. Each * indicates that the corresponding coefficient was significant in one of the OILMIN conditions in Tables 10A and 10B. Thus four *'s mean that the coefficient was significant across all four OIL10 – OIL40 conditions.

Table 12
Regional UN Voting Alignment with US and Export Dependence on China:
Oil Exporters vs Non-Exporters, 1995 - 2008

Region	Oil & Mineral Exporter	Linear Combination	OIL10	OIL20	OIL30	OIL40
EAP	No	δ_3	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)**
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)*	(–)**	(–)**	(–)
ECA	No	δ_3	(–)	(–)*	(–)	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)
LAC	No	δ_3	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***	(–)**
MENA	No	δ_3	(+)*	(–)	(–)	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***
SA	No	δ_3	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)	(–)	(+)***	(+)***
SSA	No	δ_3	(–)**	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)

NOTE. The coefficient δ_3 and the linear combination of coefficients ($\delta_3 + \delta_5$) are from the estimations presented in Tables 10A and 10B. This table reports the sign of these coefficients with standard errors at the conventional levels, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 13

Regional UN Voting Alignment with US (Stricter Measure) and Export Dependence on China: Oil Exporters vs Non-Exporters, 1995 - 2008

Dependent variable is UN voting alignment with Yes/No/Abstain/Absent votes

Region	Oil & Mineral Exporter	Coefficient	OIL10	OIL20	OIL30	OIL40
EAP	No	δ_3	(–)**	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***
ECA	No	δ_3	(–)	(–)**	(–)*	(–)**
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)*	(–)	(–)*	(–)**
LAC	No	δ_3	(–)**	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***
MENA	No	δ_3	(+)	(–)	(–)	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***
SA	No	δ_3	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)	(–)	(+)***	(+)***
SSA	No	δ_3	(–)***	(–)**	(–)**	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(+)*	(+)*	(+)*	(+)*

NOTE. The coefficient δ_3 and the linear combination of coefficients ($\delta_3 + \delta_5$) are from the estimations similar to those presented in Tables 10A and 10B, but using a different measure of UN voting alignment as indicated above. This table reports the sign of these coefficients with standard errors at the conventional levels, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 14

Regional UN Voting Alignment with US (Lenient Measure) and Export Dependence on China: Oil Exporters vs Non-Exporters, 1995 - 2008

Dependent variable is UN voting alignment with Yes/No votes

Region	Oil & Mineral Exporter	Coefficient	OIL10	OIL20	OIL30	OIL40
EAP	No	δ_3	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)*
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)
ECA	No	δ_3	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)
LAC	No	δ_3	(–)**	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)*	(–)	(–)	(–)
MENA	No	δ_3	(+)*	(–)	(–)	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***
SA	No	δ_3	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)	(–)	(+)***	(+)***
SSA	No	δ_3	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***	(–)***
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)

NOTE. The coefficient δ_3 and the linear combination of coefficients ($\delta_3 + \delta_5$) are from the estimations similar to those presented in Tables 10A and 10B, but using a different measure of UN voting alignment as indicated. This table reports the sign of these coefficients with standard errors at the conventional levels, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 15

Year-to-Year Regional UN Voting Alignment with US and Export Dependence on China: Oil Exporters vs Non-Exporters

1995 - 2008

Dependent variable is Year-to-Year measure of UN voting alignment

Region	Oil & Mineral Exporter	Coefficient	OIL10	OIL20	OIL30	OIL40
EAP	No	δ_3	(+)**	(+)**	(+)**	(+)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)
ECA	No	δ_3	(–)	(–)***	(–)**	(–)**
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)*	(–)	(–)**	(–)*
LAC	No	δ_3	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)*
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)
MENA	No	δ_3	(+)	(–)**	(–)	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)
SA	No	δ_3	(+)	(–)	(–)	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)	(–)	(+)	(+)
SSA	No	δ_3	(+)	(–)	(–)	(–)
	Yes	$\delta_3 + \delta_5$	(–)	(+)	(+)	(+)

NOTE. The coefficient δ_3 and the linear combination of coefficients ($\delta_3 + \delta_5$) are from the estimations similar to those presented in Tables 10A and 10B, but using a different measure of UN voting alignment as indicated. This table reports the sign of these coefficients with standard errors at the conventional levels, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.